Moving Beyond  Wellness Does Not Work by Shea, Dennis G. & Scanlon, Dennis
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 27 | Issue 1
2017
Moving Beyond "Wellness Does Not Work"
Dennis G. Shea
Dennis Scanlon
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Dennis G. Shea and Dennis Scanlon, Moving Beyond "Wellness Does Not Work", 27 Health Matrix 125 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol27/iss1/7
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
125 
 
Moving Beyond “Wellness Does Not Work” 
 
Dennis G. Shea,† Ph.D., Dennis Scanlon, †† Ph.D. 
Contents 
 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 125 
I. The Affordable Care Act and Wellness Incentives ............................................. 127 
II. Privacy Concerns in Wellness ............................................................................ 130 
III. Employers, Employee Health, Health Care Costs and Wellness ........................ 134 
IV. The Impact of Workplace-Wellness Programs on Health .................................. 134 
V. Summarizing Key Lessons and Future Directions .............................................. 141 
 
Introduction 
On July 11, 2013, Pennsylvania State University (“Penn State”) 
announced planned changes to its employee-health-benefits program 
called the “Take Care of Your Health” initiative (“Take Care”).1 The initiative 
was the first component of a larger plan to change health benefits at Penn 
State.2 Take Care included three components and required employees to 
comply with all three parts in order for employees to avoid a one-hundred-
dollar-per-month penalty in the form of a payroll-deducted premium 
surcharge.3 Under Take Care, employees were required to complete an 
online health-risk appraisal (“HRA”) managed by WebMD, schedule and 
provide documentation of an annual preventive-health exam with a 
licensed healthcare provider, and complete a biometric-testing battery. The 
biometric testing battery included invasive procedures and questions, 
 
†  Professor of Health Policy and Administration; Associate Dean for Undergraduate 
Studies and Outreach, College of Health and Human Development at Pennsylvania 
State University.  
††  Distinguished Professor of Health Policy and Administration; Director of the 
Center for Health Care and Policy Research at Pennsylvania State University.  
1. L. Reider Jensen, ‘Take Care of Your Health’ Initiative Announced Ahead of Open 
Enrollment, PENN STATE NEWS (Jul. 11, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/281346/2013/07/11/administration/%E2%80%98tak
e-care-your-health%E2%80%99-initiative-announced-ahead-open. 
2. See id. (explaining that Take Care of Your Health Initiative was a program to 
prepare employees and their families for open enrollment in 2014). 
3. Jill Shockey & L. Reider Jensen, Benefits changes focus on employee wellness, long-
term cost savings, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/282659/2013/07/25/administration/benefits-
changes-focus-employee-wellness-long-term-cost. 
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requiring blood-cholesterol and blood-glucose monitoring, blood-pressure 
screening, and measurement of body-mass index and waist circumference.4 
In addition, the university announced changes to its policy on spousal or 
same-sex domestic partner (“SSDP”) eligibility for health insurance 
benefits.5 The university required partners to pay a one-hundred dollar-per-
month premium surcharge to remain on Penn State’s coverage if they had 
access to health insurance through their own employers.6 The University 
also planned a tobacco-use surcharge of seventy-five dollars per month.7 
The announcement occurred during the summer months,8 a period 
when many faculty and staff are not on campus; however, several Penn 
State faculty began to voice strong negative reactions that were amplified 
by national press attention.9 Fewer than seventy days later, Penn State 
suspended the surcharge in response to faculty and staff concerns and 
created a task force to “provide advice on the implementation of the 
program and on health benefits matters.”10 
While Penn State is not the first employer to implement a worksite-
wellness program (“WWP”), the events we describe in more detail below 
and the subsequent significant national interest in its program offer a useful 
and illustrative case study for the promises and pitfalls of employer 
wellness initiatives. In this paper, we use the Penn State experience as a 
narrative to highlight some of the key issues with wellness initiatives. We 
first focus on the link between the growth of WWPs like Penn State’s and 
the Affordable Care Act and its wellness incentives. We then discuss some 
of the challenging privacy issues raised during the Penn State discussions. 
We subsequently highlight the lack of evidence underlying Penn State’s 
wellness programs, connecting the Penn State experience with research on 
other employers’ efforts to use wellness as a means for improving 
employee health and reducing healthcare costs amid uncertain evidence. 
Finally, we conclude with some key future directions related to employers 
and wellness. 
 
4. Jensen, supra note 1; Natasha Singer, Health Plan Penalty Ends At Penn State, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/after-
uproar-penn-state-suspends-penalty-fee-in-wellness-plan.html (explaining that 
WebMD runs the online questionnaire form for the “Take Care of Your Health” 
Initiative). 
5. Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3. 
6. Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3. 
7. Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3. 
8. See Jensen, supra note 1; see also Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3. 
9. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Timothy W. Martin, Penn State Workers Protest 
Wellness Plan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2013, at B6. 
10. Lisa Powers & Annemarie Mountz, Penn State Suspends Fee for Employees Who 
Don’t Take Health Care Survey, PENN STATE NEWS (Sep.18, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/288132/2013/09/18/administration/penn-state-
suspends-fee-employees-who-dont-take-health-care. 
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I. The Affordable Care Act and Wellness Incentives 
The passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”)11 established 
the framework for Penn State’s Take Care initiative, since the law included 
specific provisions to promote wellness and to allow employers to offer 
penalties and incentives for participation in employer-sponsored health-
benefits programs.12 The ACA modified federal policy regarding employer 
wellness initiatives that had been previously created in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).13 
Specifically, the ACA increased the size of the incentives and penalties tied 
to wellness programs allowed in an employer health plan from twenty 
percent of the cost of the plan to thirty percent of the cost of the plan.14 
The ACA also increased the size of the incentives and penalties tied to 
employee participation in programs related to tobacco use to fifty percent 
of the plan’s costs.15 Disability and privacy advocates raised significant 
questions during the discussions surrounding both the original federal 
regulations in HIPAA and the changes in the ACA.16 For example, the Center 
for Independence of the Disabled in New York, noting that the Office of Civil 
Rights in the United States Department of Health and Human Services had 
three hundred complaints regarding wellness programs, reviewed the 
wellness changes in the ACA and made recommendations for addressing 
these concerns.17 
Despite concerns about discrimination and the potential loss of privacy, 
employers appear to be willing to implement and expand WWPs because 
they believe that the risks associated with doing so are balanced by the 
positive effects of wellness programs on employee health and employee 
 
11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
12. See Soeren Mattke et al, A Review of the U.S. Workplace Wellness Market, RAND 
CORPORATION 1, 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/workplacewellnessmarketreview2012.pdf. 
13. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 26 
CFR §54, 33158 (2013). 
14. Id. at 33167. 
15. Id. at 33167. 
16. See Kristin Madison, The ACA, The ADA, And Wellness Program Incentives, HEALTH 
AFF. BLOG (May 13, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/13/the-aca-the-
ada-and-wellness-program-incentives/; Kristin Madison et al., Smoking, Obesity, 
Health Insurance, and Health Incentives in the Affordable Care Act, 310 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 143, 143 (2013); see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: 
ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 
2009) (extensively discussing privacy issues concerning HIPAA). 
17. Heidi Siegfried, The ACA, Wellness Programs, and People with Disabilities, CTR. FOR 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE DISABLED (2014), 
http://www.cidny.org/resources/Wellness%20Paper%20MRT%20Group%20final
%202014.pdf. 
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and employer healthcare costs.18 Penn State and its employees have faced 
significant increases in healthcare costs, and Penn State leaders described 
Take Care as part of the solution to these cost challenges.19 Penn State is 
not alone in implementing WWPs to combat increases in health care costs; 
in fact, the expansion of wellness incentives in the ACA is also known as the 
Safeway Amendment because of the active role that Safeway’s Chief 
Executive Officer played in advocating for the incentives and linking them 
to cost savings at his company.20 Two months prior to the ACA’s passage, a 
Washington Post article detailed skepticism about the evidence from 
Safeway’s program, describing how the decline in employee costs occurred 
three years before wellness incentives were implemented at Safeway and 
actually rose faster than average healthcare costs nationwide in the year 
after Safeway implemented its wellness program.21 Nevertheless, the 
wellness incentives remained part of the ACA and the incentives that the 
ACA provides have resulted in significant growth in the wellness industry, 
as vendors market their services to employers with claims of cost savings 
while employers face increasing pressure to find solutions to growing 
costs.22 
Penn State and its third-party administrator, Highmark, planned to 
implement a comprehensive set of benefits changes for 2014 and 
communicated more detail to employees on July 25, 2013.23 These benefit 
changes included the following features: 
(1) offering a qualified, high-deductible health plan including a 
health-savings account as an alternative to its traditional preferred-
provider organization (“PPO”) plan; 
 
18. Peggy Hannon et al., Stakeholder Perspectives on Workplace Health Promotion: A 
Qualitative Study of Midsized Employers in Low-Wage Industries, 27 AM. J. OF 
HEALTH PROMOTION 103, 18-109 (2012). 
19. Rodney A. Erickson, President’s Message Explains Health Care Benefits Changes at 
Penn State, PENN STATE NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/283812/2013/08/09/administration/presidents-
message-explains-health-care-benefits-changes-penn. 
20. Brendan Borrell, The Fairness of Health Insurance Incentives, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/03/health/la-he-health-incentives-
20110103. 
21. David Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape 
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2010 at G8. 
22. Vicky Valet, More Than Two-Thirds of U.S. Employers Currently Offer Wellness 
Programs, Study Says, FORBES (Jul. 8, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/vickyvalet/2015/07/08/more-than-two-thirds-of-
u-s-employers-currently-offer-wellness-programs-study-says/#2965faf46c7b. 
23. Jill Shockey & Reider L. Johnson, Health Benefit Choices, Value-Based Design Offer 
Lower-Cost Options, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/282685/2013/07/25/administration/health-benefit-
choices-value-based-design-offer-lower-cost. 
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(2) implementing a value-based benefit design option in the PPO 
plan, giving employees with high blood pressure, high cholesterol, or 
diabetes the opportunity to eliminate cost-sharing copayments and 
deductibles if they complied with preventive care protocols;24 
(3) enacting a one-hundred-dollar-per-month surcharge for 
employees’ spouses and SSDPs enrolling in Penn State’s coverage 
when coverage was available through their own employer;25 
(4) creating a tobacco-cessation and differential program that 
required employees and their spouses or SSDPs to certify each year 
that they do not use tobacco or are attempting to quit tobacco use, 
and pay a seventy-five-dollar-per-month surcharge per tobacco 
user;26 
(5) requiring employees to complete a biometric screening, and 
(6) requiring employees and their spouses or SSDPs to complete an 
online wellness profile provided by WebMD Health Services and 
certify that they have had or will have a preventive physical exam by 
their medical provider, with failure to complete these measures also 
resulting in a one-hundred-dollar-per-month surcharge.27   
Though the incentives provided for WWPs in the ACA meant that other 
employers were implementing these types of benefit changes, Penn State 
faculty and staff began raising critical questions about privacy concerns and 
the lack of credible evidence supporting the link between WWPs and 
employee health and healthcare cost. As we describe below, the program’s 
features, lapses in communication between Penn State and its faculty and 
staff, and Penn State and Highmark’s inability or refusal to provide 
adequate responses to questions led the administrative leadership of Penn 
State to suspend the biometric-screening and wellness-profile portions of 
the program and initiate further consultation with employees. In the next 
two sections, we address these issues of privacy, employee health, and 
health care costs. 
 
24. Id. 
25. Jill Shockey & L. Reider Jensen, Health Care Plan Changes Include Modifications to 
Spouse, Partner Costs, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/282688/2013/07/25/administration/health-care-
plan-changes-include-modifications-spouse-partner. 
26. Jill Shockey & L. Reidar Jensen, University Announces Tobacco Cessation, 
Differential Program, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/282692/2013/07/25/administration/university-
announces-tobacco-cessation-differential-program. 
27. Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3. 
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II. Privacy Concerns in Wellness 
While an initial Penn State news release indicated that more than a 
quarter of the university’s employees had initiated efforts to complete their 
wellness profiles and biometric screening after just two weeks,28 an opinion 
article authored by Penn State faculty member Matthew Woessner raised 
strong concerns about the ethical and privacy issues associated with 
requiring employees to complete online wellness profiles that asked for 
sensitive information about mental health, specific illnesses, and alcohol, 
tobacco, and drug use.29 
Woessner’s article was preceded by an open letter he wrote to the 
Pennsylvania chapter of the American Association of University 
Professors.30 Woessner’s efforts then gained national media coverage.31 
Together, Woessner’s writings about Penn State’s plan galvanized faculty 
and staff opinion about the privacy issues.32 A combination of factors at 
Penn State helped to create fertile ground for the growing controversy. 
First, some Penn State faculty, including a past head of the University 
Faculty Senate, Larry Catá Backer, suggested that the planning for the 
initiative was conducted without appropriate input from Penn State faculty 
and staff members.33 Backer also raised concerns that the strategic 
announcement of the program in early July, when many faculty members 
were not on contract and many staff were on vacation, was timed 
specifically to avoid strong reactions from employees.34 
An additional factor added further fuel. Though most employers had 
taken an incentive approach to their WWPs, rewarding employees who 
 
28. Jill Shockey & L. Reidar Jensen, ‘Take Care of Your Health’ Sees Record 
Participation Following Announcement, PENN STATE NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 
2013), http://news.psu.edu/story/282680/2013/07/25/administration/take-
care-your-health-sees-record-participation-following. 
29. Matthew Woessner, PSU’s punitive new health policy is an invasion of privacy: As 
I See It, PENNLIVE OP-ED (last updated Aug. 07, 2013), 
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/08/psus_punitive_new_healt
h_policy _is_an_invasion_of _privacy_as_i_see_it.html. 
30. Mathew Woessner, A Call for Action and Civil Resistance for Penn State Employees, 
PA. DIV. AAUP (July 30, 2013), https://pa-aaup.com/2013/07/30/the-penn-state-
healthcare-mandate-and-a-call-for-civil-disobedience/. 
31. See Mathews & Martin, supra note 9. 
32. Jeff Brady, Penn State To Penalize Workers Who Refuse Health Screenings, NPR 
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2013/08/02/208167230/penn-state-to-penalize-workers-who-refuse-
health-screenings. 
33. Colleen Flaherty, Weigh In or Pay, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jul. 22, 2013), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/07/22/penn-state-faculty-object-
details-new-preventive-health-care-plan. 
34. Id. 
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participated in their programs,35 Penn State chose to implement penalties 
for failing to participate in the biometric screening and wellness profile.36 In 
addition, rather than phase in this change to a penalty for failing to 
complete the biometric screening and wellness profile, Penn State 
introduced penalties that were double the national average among 
employers.37 So, the combination of intrusive questions in the WebMD 
wellness profile—such as asking employees whether they had ever driven 
after drinking—and the coercive nature of a $1200 penalty for refusing to 
reveal that information made employees consider whether employers like 
Penn State were digging too deeply into their private lives in the quest for 
wellness.38 
To respond to Penn State and Highmark’s efforts to collect their data 
and the wellness profile’s intrusive nature, Woessner urged employees to 
complete the questionnaire with ludicrous information39 and told an 
interviewer that he had “filled out his WebMD profile with nonsense,” like 
“I’m 3 feet 8 inches tall, I weigh 50 pounds, [and] my last cholesterol check 
was when I was six months old.”40 
This combination of events—questionable consultation and 
communication, intrusive questions that participants could not avoid, 
coercive financial penalties for noncompliance, Penn State’s decision to 
require sharing health information with Highmark, and Woessner’s creative 
encouragement of noncompliant compliance—ensured that the events at 
Penn State would gain greater attention. The privacy issues gained 
significant local and national media attention, with many news articles and 
stories published in major outlets like the Wall Street Journal, the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Harvard Business Review, among others.41 
 
35. Paul Fronstin, Findings From the 2011 EBRI/MGA Consumer Engagement in Health 
Care Survey, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 1, 1 (Dec. 2011), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_12-2011_No365_CEHCS.pdf. 
36. Singer, supra note 4. 
37. Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study Final Report, RAND 
CORP. 126 (2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR254/
RAND_RR254.pdf. 
38. Natasha Singer, Rules Sought for Worksite Wellness Questionnaires, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/business/rules-sought-
for-workplace-wellness-questionnaires.html. 
39. Woessner, supra note 30. 
40. Brady, supra note 32. 
41. See Mathews & Martin, supra note 9; Tom Emerick & Al Lewis, The Danger of 
Wellness Programs: Don’t Become the Next Penn State, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 20, 
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/attention-human-resources-exec; Karen Heller, 
Karen Heller: Penn State’s Unpalatable Policy on Health, PHILLY.COM (July 25, 2013), 
http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-25/news/40773924_1_penn-state-health-
incentives-health-care. 
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The University Faculty Senate scheduled a discussion of the issues at 
their first meeting on September 10, 2013.42 Representatives from the 
university’ administration and Highmark attended to answer questions 
about the program. They may have hoped that the meeting would address 
concerns and defuse the growing controversy. Instead, the administration 
and Highmark representatives failed to answer faculty concerns, further 
fueling the controversy. At this meeting, a faculty member spoke about a 
question in the WebMD profile asking female faculty and staff members to 
indicate whether they intended to attempt to have a child in the next year.43 
That this question invaded the privacy of faculty members required to 
answer it was lost on the Highmark administrator answering her question. 
Nor did Highmark or Penn State address the concerns about forcing women 
to reveal this information to anyone at the university, much less their 
insurer or a third-party vendor like WebMD. The representative’s extended 
response focused on the efforts his company was making to ensure that the 
information was kept private once it was collected, failing to understand 
that the issue was with the fact of its collection and not whether it remained 
private.44 The next person to speak cut to the heart of the privacy issue for 
many Penn State employees, describing her “difficulty with [Highmark’s] 
definition of private. For me, discussing my reproductive plans with an 
unknown entity at an insurance company does not constitute private.”45 
Since Penn State’s University Faculty Senate meetings are recorded and 
available to the public, the exchanges in the YouTube video provided in the 
New York Times article quickly became part of the national media story.46 
A little more than a week after the meeting, Penn State suspended the 
surcharge and the program and announced the formation of a task force to 
engage faculty and staff in discussion of the future of health benefits at 
Penn State.47 
 
42. Dennis Scanlon & Dennis Shea, Statement and White Paper From Penn State 
Faculty—”Assessing the Evidence for Penn State University’s “Take Care of Your 
Health” Benefits Program,” MONITORING UNIV. GUIDANCE (Sept. 8, 2013), 
http://lcbpsusenate.blogspot.com/2013/09/statement-and-white-paper-from-
penn.html (corrected version available at 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/wellness-programs-arent-ready-
for-prime-time/). 
43. Natasha Singer, On Campus A Faculty Uprising Over Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/business/on-campus-a-
faculty-uprising-over-personal-data.html. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id.; see also Penn State Professor Questions Administrators about Invasion of 
Employee Privacy, YOUTUBE (Sept. 11, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUrZLK5yA3Y (YouTube video embedded in 
the article). 
47. Powers & Mountz, supra note 10. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Moving Beyond "Wellness Does Not Work" 
133 
Just days following this decision, Representative Louise Slaughter from 
New York cited the issues raised at Penn State as she asked the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to investigate worksite-
wellness programs and to issue guidelines to protect employees from 
discrimination.48 The EEOC had already met to discuss such guidelines but 
had not issued any guidance on the relationship between the ACA’s 
provisions for wellness programs and federal antidiscrimination laws like 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act.49 In May 2016, the EEOC released final rules on 
employer wellness programs, addressing both the incentives that 
employers may offer to employees, as well as employees’ confidentiality 
rights.50 The rules allow incentives of up to thirty percent of the cost of self-
only coverage to be used for WWPs, including those that involved 
questionnaires or medical examinations, but bar incentives for having 
employees provide certain types of genetic information.51 They also 
prevent employers from requiring employees to agree to the sale and other 
uses of their data and only allow employers to view aggregated information 
about their employees’ health.52 
Penn State’s experience with workplace wellness demonstrates some 
of the challenges for employers seeking to implement WWPs as they 
attempt to balance efforts to gather information to guide improvements in 
employee health with privacy and discrimination laws. Isolated incidents of 
employees raising concerns about WWPs have occurred over the past few 
years53 and the topic has been hotly debated at research and industry 
conferences.54 As employers continue to expand WWPs, they will certainly 
test the limits of what employees are willing to accept with respect to 
incentives, privacy, and discrimination. The EEOC rules provide guidance on 
what is permissible, while Penn State’s experience demonstrates the 
constraints on their actions because of employee concerns. 
 
48. Singer, supra note 43. 
49. Singer, supra note 43. 
50. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Press Release on EEOC Issues 
Final Rules on Employer Wellness Programs (May 16, 2016), available at 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-16-16.cfm. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Jay Hancock, Workplace Wellness Programs Put Employee Privacy at Risk, WWLP 
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://wwlp.com/2015/09/28/workplace-wellness-programs-
put-employee-privacy-at-risk/. 
54. Susan Dentzer, What’s Missing in the Debate Over Employer Wellness Programs, 
HEALTH CARE BLOG (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2015/12/04/whats-missing-in-the-debate-
over-employer-wellness-programs/. 
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III. Employers, Employee Health, Health Care Costs and 
Wellness 
Given the privacy issues that wellness programs can cause, the WWPs 
would need to provide substantial benefits to encourage employees to 
participate in the change. While the benefits of WWPs received far less 
media attention than the risks in the case of Penn State, the benefits were 
another part of the argument that Penn State and Highmark advanced. This 
section focuses on summarizing the University’s effort to advance their case 
that the impact of WWPs on two primary outcomes—healthcare costs and 
employee health—would be positive for Penn State employees. In 
describing the program to Penn State employees, the university identified 
reduced health-benefits costs and improved employee and beneficiary 
health as important goals of the changes to employee health benefits.55 As 
we discuss in the next section, their arguments’ weaknesses further 
undercut their efforts to convince employees to accept the Take Care 
program. 
IV. The Impact of Workplace-Wellness Programs on Health 
In presenting the case for the Take Care program to employees, Penn 
State referenced a handful of studies on the impact of WWPs.56 Only one of 
the studies Penn State cited, a report from the Centers for Disease Control’s 
Task Force on Community Preventive Services (“Task Force”), provided a 
detailed analysis of the health outcomes associated with WWPs.57 The 
report assessed the value of workplace HRAs and other commonly used 
workplace interventions, such as smoking-cessation policies and 
immunization initiatives.58 The study reviewed the evidence on assessment 
of health risks with feedback (“AHRF”) programs. AHRF programs include 
 
55. Shockey & Jensen, supra note 3. 
56. See Annemarie Mountz, Health Care Changes to be Discussed at Faculty Senate 
Meeting, PENN ST. UNIV. NEWS (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://news.psu.edu/story/286134/2013/09/03/administration/health-care-
changes-be-discussed-faculty-senate-meeting (citing Larry S. Chapman, The Art of 
Health Promotion, 24 AM. J. OF HEALTH PROMOTION 1 (2009); then citing R. E. Soler et 
al., A Systematic Review of Selected Interventions for Worksite Health Promotion, 
38 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. S237 (2010); Barbara L. Naydeck et al., The Impact 
of the Highmark Employee Wellness Programs on 4-Year Healthcare Costs, 50 J. OF 
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 146; L. C. Williams & B. T. Day, Medical Cost Savings for 
Web-Based Wellness Program Participants Form Employers Engaged in Health 
Promotion Activities, 25:4 AM. J. OF HEALTH PROMOTION 272 (2001)). 
57. Center for Disease Control, Task Force on Community Preventive Services, 
Recommendations for Worksite-Based Interventions to Improve Worker’s Health, 
38 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. S232, S232 (2010), 
https://www.thecommunityguide.org/worksite/Worksite2010Recommendation
s_TaskForce.pdf. 
58. Id. 
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three elements: (1) the collection of information about at least two 
personal health behaviors or indicators; (2) translation of the information 
collected into one or more individual risk scores or categorical descriptions 
of risk status; and (3) providing participants with feedback regarding their 
risk status, either overall or with respect to specifıc risk behaviors.59 The 
report also examined AHRF Plus programs, which are AHRF programs that 
include other intervention components in a worksite setting.60 An AHRF 
Plus program, for example, may offer incentives for employees who smoke 
to enter a smoking cessation program after their HRA.61 
While Penn State cited the study as evidence of the positive impacts of 
WWPs on employee health, the Task Force’s recommendations were mixed 
regarding the effectiveness of these various workplace interventions.62 In 
its review, the Task Force indicated that there was insufficient evidence 
about the effectiveness of AHRFs when implemented alone as a primary 
intervention.63 For example, the Task Force explained that its 
finding of insufficient evidence to determine effectiveness is based 
on concerns with recurring combinations of flaws in individual studies 
across the body of evidence. The most important concern was the 
paucity of comparative studies in which the intervention was offered 
to one defined population and outcomes compared to another 
defined population that received a lesser (or no) intervention. Many 
of the studies identified in this review provided the intervention of 
interest (AHRF alone) to the “control” arm of a trial that was primarily 
intended to evaluate the effectiveness of a more comprehensive 
intervention that included AHRF as a single component. The absence 
of measurements from a relevant concurrent comparison group in 
these studies raised the potential for bias in the estimated 
intervention effects, particularly for self-reported changes in 
behavior. Most studies analyzed only a small subset of participants 
for whom there were complete follow-up data, which may have 
favored the inclusion of results from individuals who had changed 
their health behaviors in the interval.64 
While the Task Force reached a more positive assessment of AHRF Plus 
programs, Penn State’s efforts did not provide such interventions, at least 
in their initial phase.65 As a result, the university’s communications and 
evidence undercut their own claims about positive health impacts. 
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Additional research presented by faculty during the course of the 
subsequent year further clarified that weakness.66 For example, a review 
article on WWPs published just months before the announcement of the 
Take Care initiative suggested that the expectation that WWPs are effective 
is based on three key assumptions.67 First, this expectation is predicated on 
the assumption that wellness programs can accurately identify employees 
with specific health risks and effectively target incentives to employees for 
participation in wellness interventions to address these risks more 
effectively than usual care.68 Second, it assumes that financial incentives to 
participate in wellness programs will lead employees to change their 
behavior in a way that will improve their health.69 Third, it assumes that 
improvements in health will result in cost savings for employers.70 The first 
two assumptions are critical for having an impact on employee health.71 The 
study’s authors, however, found little evidence of improved health as a 
result of WWPs.72 In examining weight-loss programs, the authors examine 
four comprehensive literature reviews, none of which find evidence of long-
term sustained weight loss.73 Their review of smoking-cessation programs 
similarly found that programs had initial effects, but that there was often 
no long-term impact.74 They found no comprehensive, high quality reviews 
of programs to manage high blood pressure or cholesterol.75 
That research was one of a number of studies presented as part of a 
report to the University Faculty Senate at the September 2013 meeting and 
then in a more detailed report the University’s Health Care Task Force 
prepared and presented in April 2014.76 Those reports included evidence 
from comprehensive reviews by a group of researchers,77 as well as a 
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systematic review of evidence by a related group of investigators.78 The 
report of Penn State’s Health Care Task Force concluded that 
workplace wellness programs appear to have, at best, a small, but 
statistically significant impact on a few employee health behaviors or 
health risks. These appear to be most commonly found in programs 
addressing smoking cessation or weight loss. The clinical relevance of 
these changes may be very modest. The long-run maintenance of the 
improved behaviors/risk reductions and the impact on actual health 
outcomes, such as mortality and morbidity, are not well-established 
by research. The short-run improvements appear to occur primarily 
in programs that apply fairly significant and ongoing incentives 
and/or involve more than basic lifestyle management programs.79 
In its efforts to communicate to employees about the positive effects 
of WWPs on employee health, Penn State relied almost exclusively on a 
single study that did not fully support the features of their program.80 While 
at first glance WWPs’ impact on health may seem like common sense, the 
chain of connections to create real health improvements is more complex.81 
Though they have no legal obligation to demonstrate that WWPs truly 
improve health, employers have a moral and ethical responsibility to ensure 
that their employees are well-informed, especially when the employer 
requests, requires, or incentivizes participation in these WWPs. 
The impact of WWPs on health care costs is, of course, the second 
reason that employers often argue for their implementation.82 Employers 
argue that healthcare cost savings can be passed on to employees through 
cost-sharing, lower premiums, or higher wage and salary growth for 
employees.83 The importance of these cost issues was heightened for 
employers because the ACA planned to impose a “Cadillac tax” on 
employers who had excessive healthcare costs.84 Among the questions that 
the Faculty Senate submitted to the Penn State Benefits Office in advance 
of its meeting in September 2013 was one that challenged the quality of the 
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evidence supporting the design of the Take Care program and its impact on 
costs.85 In its response, Penn State referenced three studies that focused 
primarily on the cost savings associated with wellness programs.86 
One well-known study cited in the university’s response reported a 
positive return on investment (“ROI”) of $3.27 in reduced healthcare 
sending per dollar spent on wellness programs, experienced over the first 
few years of a program’s operation.87 In addition, the authors reported a 
positive return related to reductions in employee absenteeism, estimated 
to be valued at $2.73 per dollar spent on wellness programs.88 As the 
authors note, however, these estimates of savings are far less than previous 
reports, a result they attributed to the more rigorous evaluation standards 
that they applied in reviewing the literature.89 The authors also listed 
important caveats in the limitations section of their study,90 stating that 
their 
analysis cannot address the important question of which attributes 
of wellness programs are most important, and how such programs 
should be optimally designed. Well-designed field experiments that 
compare the effectiveness of program components such as patient 
education and professional counseling across different industries and 
populations are needed to answer it.91 
The university’s response to the Faculty Senate question about 
supporting evidence also referenced two published Highmark studies as 
evidence supporting the proposed Take Care program.92 One study 
examined the impact of a WWP that Highmark initiated for its own 
employees in 2002.93 It estimated the impact of the program on costs for 
four years after the program’s implementation and calculated an overall 
ROI.94 The study’s reported results suggested an overall ROI of $1.76 for 
every dollar spent on the wellness program.95 Specifically, the authors 
estimated that participants in Highmark’s wellness program had annual 
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healthcare expenditures that were $176.47 lower than those that did not 
participate in the wellness program, with the majority of the savings 
resulting from lower hospitalization costs for program participants versus 
non-participants.96 
The second Highmark study attempted to examine the impact and 
value of the “web based wellness program components” that were added 
to existing wellness programs between 2004 and 2007.97 The study 
examined employees whose employers adopted Highmark’s web-based 
wellness features—the treatment group—and compared their outcomes to 
the outcomes for employees whose employers did not adopt any of 
Highmark’s wellness-program components—the control group.98 The 
results showed lower costs for program participants relative to non-
participants, and also suggested that web-based content can have value.99 
Just as there were questions about the quality of the evidence relating 
WWPs to cost savings, there were similar questions about the evidence 
relating WWPs to improvements in the health status of wellness-program 
participants. Research presented to the University Faculty Senate in 
September 2013 and April 2014 demonstrated less dramatic evidence of 
cost savings.100 The university cited only four studies to provide evidence 
for the impact of its changes on employee health and healthcare costs and 
did so without fully understanding the limitations of the evidence cited.101 
Also problematic about the university’s response to the questions 
about evidentiary support for their claims was that two of the three studies 
they cited were conducted by parties of interest. Two of the three studies 
were from their own third-party administrator, a vendor with a 
demonstrated interest in proving the effectiveness of programs that they 
were marketing and selling to Penn State and other employers.102 Just as 
some policy-makers during the ACA debate seemed to accept the Safeway 
evidence without critical review, only to later find important questions 
raised about the data, employers and their human-resource offices can be 
too reliant on vendors to provide evidence on the effects of WWPs. Reliance 
on evidence sources that have an interest in promoting WWPs, coupled 
with a failure to fully engage with the evidence base, creates conditions for 
employers to face significant employee opposition to WWP. 
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As raised in discussions about conflicts of interest in medical 
research,103 vendor-supported studies should be used with caution. There 
are many decisions made in evaluation research, including the selection of 
the sample; how program and healthcare costs are allocated among the 
wellness program, the employer, the employees, and the insurer; how to 
address co-occurring changes in health benefits; and a host of other issues 
that will impact results.104 While some of these concerns were noted in the 
published studies that Penn State cited, the inherent conflict of interest in 
vendor-based research requires employers to be extremely cautious in 
basing decisions on such evidence. 
Furthermore, the question of whether health improvements actually 
lead to cost savings is additionally complicated by the fact that many 
employers change their health benefits at the same time as they implement 
or add to their WWPs.105 WWPs involve increased costs associated with 
duplicate testing, false positives, and associated follow-up costs. In 
addition, in some cases, WWPs simply adjust the timing of costs, rather than 
preventing costs;106 simultaneous changes that adjust consumer cost-
sharing in a variety of ways complicate determining whether costs were 
actually reduced or simply shifted across time and between employer and 
employee.107 These program savings might not be the result of health 
improvements; instead, savings “may come from making workers with 
health risks pay more for their health care than workers without health 
risks.”108 It becomes even more complicated to show employees that they 
are benefitting from lower costs when factors other than the WWP are also 
changing.109 
Penn State’s efforts to demonstrate the benefits of its WWP on 
employee health and healthcare costs evinced some of the pitfalls of trying 
to expand wellness programs for employers. The university offered a thin 
evidence base for the impact of its changes on employee health and 
healthcare costs, without fully understanding the limitations of the 
evidence it cited. In its effort to demonstrate the benefits of its WWP, Penn 
State also relied on sources of evidence that had conflicts of interest. 
Subsequent review of the research demonstrated to the employees that 
the evidence for the benefits of the WWP changes was much weaker than 
the university had suggested. Penn State failed to adequately communicate 
with its faculty and staff, failed to address its employees’ privacy concerns, 
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and cited studies that failed to dispel—and in some cases, raised—concerns 
about the benefits of WWPs, creating an environment of employee distrust. 
V. Summarizing Key Lessons and Future Directions 
Penn State’s problematic effort to implement a WWP and its 
subsequent decision to drop significant elements of the program 
emphasizes the many challenges for employers in trying to use WWPs and 
provides some guidance on how employers and employees can move 
beyond a “wellness-does-not-work” mentality. Employers and employees 
should establish shared ownership of the WWP through extensive 
consultation and communication prior to design and implementation of the 
plan. In implementing WWPs, employers are asking employees to share 
sensitive information and to modify the way they have traditionally 
interacted with healthcare providers. Employers claim to be interested in 
employee health, but often stress the need to control healthcare costs. Cost 
savings are difficult to track and both employers and employees want some 
stake in those savings. Without significant consultation and communication 
in the design and implementation of the WWP, employees are unlikely to 
accept the changes and employers are unlikely to find they have shifted the 
needle on health or costs. 
Given employers’ growing interest in having employees share personal 
health information, employers owe it to their employees to exercise due 
diligence, to collect only what is necessary, to protect what is collected, and 
to give employees options regarding what information they provide. Dr. 
Donald Berwick, President Emeritus and Senior Fellow at the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement and former Administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, notes that our health system must change 
the way it treats information, arguing that medical records should belong 
to the patients and adopting the rule of a public-health researcher: 
“Nothing about me without me.”110 Employers engaging in WWPs must 
begin with the assumption that the data belongs to the employee/patient, 
and allow employees to make the rules about access to their information. 
Employers and employees should also work to develop their own 
independent assessment of the evidence in support of or against WWPs. 
Cherry-picking individual studies or relying on vendors with inherent 
conflicts of interest to provide evidence for WWP is unacceptable. Efforts 
should focus on a more sophisticated review of the evidence and on 
identifying and adopting evidence-based practices. Rigorous evaluations 
often dramatically reduce the estimated ROIs from WWPs. Concerns about 
conflicts of interest and their impact on medical research are considerable. 
Employers and health plans, however, are not in the business of conducting 
rigorous evaluations of health programs and have deep conflicts of interest 
in the operation of such programs. Employers and employees should work 
together to identify evidence from public agencies (e.g., Department of 
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Labor, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention), health-services research organizations (e.g., 
RAND, Truven Health Analytics), or private foundations that offer a more 
independent and scientific review. 
Assessing the evidence requires going beyond just examining WWPs 
and their role in the healthcare industry. Employers and employees need to 
develop a shared understanding of the real drivers of healthcare inflation 
and health-benefits costs, both nationally and in their local regions. Despite 
the challenges, both parties need to work together to see how technology, 
malpractice, demographic changes, health-benefit design, provider prices 
and practice patterns, and more drive costs. Lifestyle and health behaviors 
are only one component of the cost equation in healthcare and addressing 
only those criteria may not be the easiest or most effective strategy for 
controlling costs and improving health. Health-behavior change is hard 
work; employees are trying to reverse decades-old lifestyles. In general, 
incentives, not penalties, are more effective.111 In addition, the evidence 
base on incentives for health-behavior change is relatively new. Employers 
should move cautiously and continually re-evaluate their efforts. Moving 
beyond the idea that wellness does not work is likely to require substantial 
effort to retreat from the existing standard vendor-driven, third-party, pre-
packaged set of programs of questionable credibility. Furthermore, 
employers and employees need to understand how WWPs fit into the 
overall design of their health benefits and in the overall context of their 
health system. WWPs focus on changing the behaviors of consumers on the 
demand side of healthcare. These programs do little to address the supply-
side cost issues. To have an impact on costs and health, employers and 
employees should also consider the local cost drivers from the supply side, 
especially as healthcare-provider markets change through consolidation, 
new payment models, organizational changes like accountable care 
organizations and patient-centered medical homes, and efforts to revise 
the ACA. In some cases, wellness does not work because substantial 
changes are necessary on the supply side of healthcare for costs to fall and 
health to improve. 
To move beyond the idea that wellness does not work, employers need 
to develop an understanding of what components of WWPs work best for 
their particular workforce, worksites, and provider markets. They need to 
engage in an ongoing discussion with their employees and consultants 
about the design of their WWPs and address the challenging privacy issues 
with respect to employees’ rights to their own health information. Finally, 
if the goal is truly to improve employee health, then employers must 
engage in far more discussion with employees about how to help them 
change and far fewer conversations with third-party vendors on how to 
make employees change. 
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